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Expert Decision making: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Perspective. 
Research has shown that expert decision makers often make decisions in their area of 
expertise that are superior to those of lay people – for example expert physicians are better at 
discriminating levels of cardiac risk (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006), chess masters can identify the most 
promising moves during a game of chess (Chase & Simon, 1973; deGroot, 1978) and judges (but 
not jurors) are able to distinguish between qualitatively different types of harm in a legal case 
(Eisenberg, Rachlinski, & Wells, 2002). However, research has also shown experts are fallible 
and susceptible to many of the cognitive biases that affect lay people (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  For example, expert physicians make different choices based on whether the same 
information is presented in positive or negative terms (known as a framing effect) and fail to 
adjust sufficiently for population base rates when judging a conditional probability (e.g., the 
chances that a 40-year-old woman has breast cancer conditional on a positive diagnostic test) 
(e.g., Croskerry, in press; McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Lloyd, 
2006; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992). In fact, research has shown that under certain circumstances 
experts can be more biased than novices in their area of expertise (Reyna, Chick, Corbin, & Hsia, 
2014). In this chapter, we discuss decision making of experts including physicians, judges, and 
intelligence officers.  Using the lens of fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), we provide a framework to 
explain why experts often make superior decisions, and when they are likely to be as susceptible 
or more susceptible to bias (systematic departures from applicable normative rational theory; 
Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002) than laypeople.   
Although findings of biases among experts are counterintuitive, FTT predicts these 
outcomes and simultaneously accounts for the ability of experts to make better decisions in many 
real-life situations. The key, as we illustrate, is the distinction between meaning-driven as 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 3	
opposed to rote mental representations.  We begin by introducing FTT as a dual-process account 
of memory and reasoning.  We then describe how FTT applies in a wide range of domains and 
can serve broadly to explain, predict, and improve expert decision making.  
 
Traditional Dual-process Theories 
Traditional dual-process theories – which propose that two basic processing types 
underlie decision making – differentiate Type 1 processes that are “automatic, fast, and intuitive” 
and Type 2 processes that are “slow, sequential and correlated with measures of general 
intelligence” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Thompson, 2014). These theories are often described as 
“default interventionist” because Type 1 processing is the default way of thinking, whereas Type 
2 “higher order” processing is evoked occasionally and can be used to intervene by overriding 
Type 1 thinking (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; but see Barbey & Sloman, 2007, 
for a parallel competitive view). Dual-process theories associate biased judgments with Type 1 
thinking and “rational” judgments with Type 2 thinking (Epstein, 1994; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & 
Wistrich, 2007), although they recognize that Type 1 processing often leads to correct answers 
and Type 2 can produce biases in some circumstances (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).    
Traditional dual-process theory has been applied to expert decision making in two 
primary ways, both of which recognize that “intuition” plays a role in expert decision making 
and are based on the assumption that intuitive judgments and preferences have the characteristics 
of Type 1 processing in that they are automatic, arise effortlessly and often come to mind 
without immediate justification (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Thompson, 2014). The first 
approach, the Heuristics and Biases (HB) approach, suggests that experts (and laypersons) are 
subject to intuitive biases because they take mental shortcuts called “heuristics” (Guthrie, 
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Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). This approach has been 
mischaracterized as focusing on flaws in cognitive performance.  However, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) pointed out that “It is not surprising that useful heuristics…are retained, even 
though they occasionally lead to errors in prediction or estimation.” (p. 1130).  Nevertheless, in 
this view, one way that experts can avoid such biases is by overriding Type 1 thinking with Type 
2 thinking (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1971).  
 The second approach to expert decision making arising from a traditional dual-process 
theory perspective is Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) (Kahneman & Klein. 2009). NDM 
focuses on the success of expert intuition, suggesting that experts often rely on intuition (defined 
as the recognition of patterns stored in memory, Chase & Simon, 1973) and use cues and tacit 
knowledge to make good judgments without directly comparing options (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009). Based mainly on anecdotal observations in real-world contexts, expertise is said to be 
developed by learning cues in a “valid” environment--an environment that offers stable 
relationships between objectively identifiable cues and subsequent events between cues and the 
outcomes of possible actions (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Schraagen, in press). Thus, NDM 
researchers argue that “intuition” in experts can be explained in terms of recognition of familiar 
elements (Schraagen, in press; Simon, 1981; 1992).  That is, the claim is that cue-action pairs 
stored in long term memory (after considerable experience with the environment) and 
generalized schemas (pattern matching or feature matching) are applied to make decisions 
(Schraagen, in press), a process called  “recognition-primed decisions” (Klein, Calderwood, & 
Clinton-Cirocco, 1986).  In atypical situations, which cannot easily be explained through 
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recognition of familiar elements, experts are said to gather additional information and clarify the 
situation through story building (Schraagen, in press).  
 NDM and HB both acknowledge that intuitive judgments can arise from genuine skill 
and be beneficial, but can also arise from inappropriate application of heuristic processes 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). They also both suggest that the determination of whether intuitive 
judgments can be trusted requires examination of the environment in which the judgment is 
made and the opportunity the judge has had to learn from the regularities of that environment.   
 FTT originated as an alternative to the HB approach, but with the goal of accounting for 
those empirical findings and predicting new findings that are not captured by prior approaches 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1994, 1995).  FTT also shares some assumptions with NDM, for example, 
incorporating models of recognition and recall to explain decision making, and vice versa, but it 
is grounded in specific experimental tests and mathematical models as well as naturalistic 
observations (Reyna, 2012).  To take one example, FTT relies on the extensive evidence 
undermining schema theory (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983), substituting the empirically supported 
construct of gist.  Moreover, FTT provides a different explanation of expert decision making, 
based on the distinction between reliance on surface level verbatim representations and meaning-
based gist representations, which are processed in parallel.  In addition, FTT is a developmental 
theory that predicts greater reliance on gist representations, as opposed to verbatim 
representations, in judgment and decision making as experience in a domain increases. For such 
development to occur, experience must afford not only the opportunity for feedback about 
whether successful outcomes are associated with cues, but also the opportunity for meaningful 
conceptual learning about why those outcomes are associated with those cues (Reyna, 2008).   
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FTT predicts counterintuitive findings in the literature that are not predicted by HB or 
NDM for reasoners generally (e.g., see Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, 2008) as well as for experts 
(e.g., Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). According to FTT, experts are not just better reasoners due to 
greater knowledge and recognition of recurrent patterns, but because the nature of their cognitive 
processing in a domain changes, becoming more gist-based, as they develop expertise in that 
domain.  In FTT, cognitive development from novice to expert is predicted to be similar to that 
from child to adult when the latter reason about everyday domains, and, as we discuss, evidence 
supports this prediction.  By “gist-based,” we mean based on simple (but central), meaningful 
representations, per definitions in psycholinguistics (e.g., Kintsch, 1974). This developmental 
shift in processing produces paradoxical effects, such as experts using simpler processing (e.g., 
fewer dimensions of information) to make better decisions than novices, but also being more 
subject to gist-based biases, such as “false” memories for events that represent inferences about 
those events (e.g., see Table 2 in Reyna & Lloyd, 1997, 2006). HB and NDM theories have not 
made such predictions; these and many other FTT predictions do not follow naturally from the 
core assumptions of HB and NDM.  Indeed some research on FTT rules out HB’s and NDM’s 
predictions (e.g., HB theory is ruled out in Reyna et al., 2014; and recognition memory ideas 
used in NDM are ruled out in Reyna & Brainerd, 1994), although recent work has sought to 
reconcile these views (see Toplak, in press).  In sum, applying detailed processing models of 
tasks that have been tested in experiments and mathematical models, including relevant research 
findings from HB and NDM approaches, FTT predicts when reasoning is likely to be superior 
with expertise, and when reasoning biases are likely to increase with expertise, depending on 
specific features of a task (Adam & Reyna, 2005; Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003; Wilhelms, 
Corbin, & Reyna, 2015).  
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FTT Background 
 FTT is a dual-process theory of decision making grounded in research on memory, 
reasoning, judgment, and decision making – and their development from children to adults and 
novices to experts. FTT proposes that two basic types of memory representation – verbatim and 
gist – are encoded, stored, retrieved, and forgotten separately, and roughly in parallel (Reyna, 
Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016). Verbatim memory is memory for surface information, for 
example, memory representations of exact words, numbers, and pictures (e.g. “there is a 20% 
chance of snow today” or “there is a 20% chance of death from this medical procedure”). 
Verbatim memory is a symbolic, mental representation of the stimulus, not the stimulus itself. 
Gist memory is a symbolic, mental representation for essential bottom line meaning, the 
“substance” of information irrespective of exact words, numbers, or pictures (e.g. “there is a low 
chance of snow today” or “there is a high chance of death from this medical procedure”). This 
means that the same surface form of “20% chance” can have a different gist depending on 
context – in the examples above a 20% chance of snow is likely to be considered a relatively low 
risk, but a 20% chance of death is likely to be considered a relatively high risk (Reyna, 2008). 
According to FTT, informed (e.g., expert) decisions pivot on appreciating the gist of relevant 
facts, such as 20% chance, not on merely remembering the verbatim numbers, and prior work 
has shown that these are independent processes (Reyna & Hamilton, 2001). 
For example, when deciding whether to have a medical procedure known as “carotid 
endarterectomy” to remove obstructions in the carotid artery, informed adults should ideally 
appreciate that surgery has a non-trivial risk of death (a categorical some-risk vs. no-risk 
distinction), rather than just recalling the fact there is a 2% risk of death (a more specific, fine 
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grained distinction; Reyna & Hamilton, 2001).   More fine-grained distinctions are required, 
however, if decision options cannot be distinguished with simplest gist. For example when 
choosing between two operations, both of which have a non-trivial risk of death, a patient would 
rely on a more finely grained distinction, such as a higher versus a lower risk of death because 
both options have some risk, and categorical gist does not distinguish the options (Reyna, 2012).  
Verbatim and simplest categorical gist exist at opposite ends of a continuum and multiple  
representations are usually encoded at varying levels of precision between these extremes (e.g., a 
20% chance of snow, a less than 50% chance of snow, a low chance of snow, some chance of 
snow; Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008). Simplest gist is the least precise representation, such as 
some chance of snow in the previous example. These levels of precision from verbatim (a 20% 
chance of snow) to simplest gist (some chance of snow) are roughly analogous to scales of 
measurement (exact numerical values, ordinal, and categorical distinctions; Reyna, 2012). 
Verbatim and gist representations are independent of each other and are retrieved independently, 
predictions supported by research in the basic science literature, as illustrated in Table 1.   
FTT posits that there is a developmental trend from reliance on verbatim representations 
to reliance on increasingly simple gist representations. Therefore, as an individual becomes more 
experienced in a domain—so long as that experience provides the opportunity to gain conceptual 
insight--they will rely on increasingly simple gist to make decisions. Reliance on gist and 
verbatim representations both develop with experience, but a preference for simple gist-based 
processing (the processing that occurs when gist-based representations are relied on, which gives 
it certain characteristics, for example, it is more fuzzy and impressionistic than verbatim-based 
processing) emerges with experience in a domain. This means that in familiar everyday decisions 
that people are repeatedly exposed to, such as risky decisions for rewards, we see a development 
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from reliance on verbatim to simplest gist from childhood to young adulthood (Reyna & Ellis, 
1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006) and beyond young adulthood for professionals who must deal 
frequently with high-stakes risks (Reyna et al., 2014).  
Gist-based processing is therefore developmentally advanced based on several 
considerations, such as later emergence in development with experience and reflection of 
meaningful distinctions that matter in judgment and decision making.  Importantly, FTT differs 
from NDM in that gist is not about processing entire cue matters, but rather decision making 
based on bottom-line meaning rather than superficial surface detail (Reyna 2012). Gist-based 
processing is distinguished from the “satisficing” strategies in the HB or NDM traditions and, 
unlike in HB or NDM, the key to gist-based processing is meaning. Gist-based processing is not 
about doing less doing less or exerting less cognitive effort (as tested in many experiments); it is 
about understanding simple meaning and, thus, getting to the nub of a decision (e.g., Adam & 
Reyna, 2005; Lloyd & Reyna, 2009; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). For example, patients’ symptoms 
cannot be easily reduced to a “cookbook” that provides lists of symptoms and diagnoses, and 
even sophisticated computer programs to accomplish such a cookbook have generally failed 
(Lloyd & Reyna, 2009; Reyna et al, 2003).  Instead, the best diagnosticians understand disease 
mechanisms. According to FTT, good decision making, then, is based on the essence of what 
really matters, rather than superficial details (Reyna, 2013).  
However, reliance on gist is also predicted to (and has been shown to) result in bias when 
content and context foment a semantic bias that goes beyond literal information, as in framing 
biases, false memories, conjunction fallacies and hindsight biases (e.g., Reyna, 2013; Reyna et 
al., 2002; Reyna, 2005). In addition, gist-based processing is distinguished from “fast” impulsive 
processing. FTT recognizes that inhibiting impulses is important in decision making, but 
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separates this from reliance on gist or verbatim representations (Reyna, Wilhelms, McCormick, 
& Weldon, 2015).   
 
FTT and Expert Decision Making 
As discussed, according to FTT, development is a process of acquiring meaningful 
experience, which tends to increases with age for everyday decision making and with domain-
specific expertise (Reyna et al, 2014). This developmental process leads to more than knowledge 
acquisition, but rather to a tendency to rely on gist representations that reflect meaning, despite 
processing and remembering verbatim details. Therefore, FTT makes two specific predictions 
that traditional dual-process theories do not make. First, experts will rely on simpler distinctions 
(gist) when making decisions in their area of expertise. Second, experts will show more bias that 
novices--called a “developmental reversal” in FTT--in tasks in which bias is caused by reliance 
on gist, such as framing tasks (see Reyna et al, 2014, and discussion below), and hindsight bias 
tasks (see Reyna, 2005, and discussion below). We now discuss each of these predictions in the 
context of research into expert decision making in different domains.  
 
Medical Experts 
One of the most important areas for studying and improving expert decision making is in 
the domain of medical decision making. In addition to life or death decisions, doctors must make 
many choices that temporarily or permanently affect the well-being and life satisfaction of their 
patients – such as whether to prescribe a blood thinner that will reduce the likelihood of a heart 
attack but also interfere with an active lifestyle or whether to diagnose a clinically borderline 
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child with a disorder that allows insurance coverage but also leaves the child permanently 
labeled. 
Several studies of medical decision making have confirmed FTT’s counterintuitive 
predictions that experts rely more on gist than novices, as reflected in processing fewer, but the 
most meaningful, dimensions of information and making simpler all-or-none distinctions. For 
example, cardiologists who have greater experience with heart disease than generalist physicians 
have been shown to make more accurate diagnostic judgments about chest pain, but they rely on 
fewer pieces of information and make cruder all-or-none admission decisions—mainly 
discharging the patients who have chest pain (with follow-up) or sending them to intensive care 
(Reyna & Lloyd, 2006).  Generalist physicians make more nuanced decisions than cardiologists 
do, processing more dimensions of information more elaborately and sending patients to wider 
range of destinations, such as levels of monitored hospitalization as well as discharge or 
intensive care.  The tendency to process simple gist is even greater among the most expert 
cardiologists.  Similarly, emergency medical technicians have been shown to know more about 
practice guidelines and to make better decisions that are guideline-consistent, but they rely on 
more vague, intuitive gist, and fewer dimensions of information (Lazar, 2012).  This reliance on 
gist is revealed when patients do not fit the guidelines, and more experienced technicians violate 
the verbatim rules of the guideline but offer superior medical care.  This prediction was tested by 
constructing patient profiles that orthogonally crossed the factors of correct/incorrect gist of 
medical care with agreement/disagreement with verbatim guidelines.  Experts scored higher than 
novices on correct gist and guideline-agreement patients but “lower” (fewer technically correct 
answers) than novices for correct gist and guideline disagreement patients. 
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Research into expert decision making in the medical domain has also provided support 
for FTTs second prediction, that experts will show more bias that novices in their area of 
expertise in tasks in which bias is caused by reliance on gist. Despite extensive medical 
education, however, nurses, physicians and other medical personnel have repeatedly been shown 
to fall victim to decision biases such as being influenced by alternate framing of the same 
information (Hux, Levinton & Naylor, 1994; Forrow, Taylor, & Arnold, 1992; McGettigan et al., 
1999), and errors in disjunctive probability judgments (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006) (for a summary of 
other biases in clinical decision making, see Croskerry, in press). These biases are two biases that 
are associated with reliance on gist (see Weldon, Corbin, & Reyna, 2013). Therefore, FTT would 
predict that in their area of expertise medical experts would be more susceptible to alternate 
framing of the same information (for a detailed discussion of FTT predictions regarding framing, 
see the section on intelligence agents below), and errors in disjunctive probability judgments.   
There is research to support the contention that medical experts are more susceptible to 
being influenced by alternate framing of the same information in their domain of expertise than 
novices. Christensen et al. (1991) presented twelve gain or loss framed clinical scenarios to 
medical students, residents, and physicians. For each scenario, subjects had to choose between 
two options – surgery or medical treatment. Gain-framed scenarios described the chance of 
survival or treatment success whereas loss-framed scenarios described the chance of death or 
treatment failure. Medical students, who were the least advanced developmentally in this study, 
showed no significant framing effect for any of the clinical scenarios. As predicted by FTT, the 
more experienced medical personnel (residents and physicians) showed greater framing effects; 
they were more likely to prefer the medical treatment in the gain versus loss frame. Thus, a 
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developmental reversal was found in that increases in expertise were associated with greater 
reliance on gist processing and greater susceptibility to decision biases.  
 
Intelligence and Security Experts 
 Intelligence and security experts are a group of professionals who are expert in making 
risky decisions (for example decisions about national security). Therefore, FTT predicts that 
when making decisions involving risk, intelligence and security experts should rely on simpler 
distinctions than controls and show more biases associated with gist-based processing.  
 Consistent with FTT predictions, research has suggested that security experts make 
superior decisions and that this is due to reliance on gist. In one experiment, Pachur and 
Marinello (2013) compared the decision strategies and choice patterns of airport customs officers 
and a group of novices regarding which passengers should be submitted to a search prior to 
boarding an airplane, specifically looking at two different decision strategies – compensatory 
strategies  representing straightforward implementations of the notion that decisions involve the 
evaluation of multiple cues (Klein, 1998), and “take-the-best” strategies where cures are 
inspected in descending order of validity and inspection of cues is stopped as soon as the 
alternatives differ on a given cue (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Based on interviews with a 
separate group of customs officials, a list of eight cues considered valid for identifying 
passengers was compiled, along with the respective values considered diagnostic of an individual 
trying to smuggle drugs. Cues included the country in which the flight originated, gender, the 
speed of the passenger’s gait, and the amount of luggage they carried, while values ranged from 
those indicating a low likelihood of drug smuggling (Europe, Female, Normal walking speed, 
Several bags) to those indicating a higher likelihood of smuggling (South America, Male, 
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Hurried, One bag). Pairs of passenger profiles were then constructed using this information and 
participants were asked to decide which of the two passengers would be more likely to smuggle 
illegal drugs. Participants also ranked the importance of each cue in forming their decisions and 
how confident they were in their cue rankings.  
Customs officers were not only more consistent in their cue rankings (a characteristic of 
rational decision making) – all but one ranked “flight origin” as the most important cue – their 
cue rankings showed greater discrimination (i.e., dispersion) than the group of novices. By 
weighting the cues more differentially, customs officers were also able to rely on fewer cues and 
were more confident in their cue rankings (customs officers focused on one cue, whereas novices 
were more likely to use a compensatory strategy in which several cues were individually 
weighted). Finally, the cue rankings generated by the customs officers were more consistent with 
the chief customs officer who had the highest “success” rating according to internal airport 
statistics, suggesting that although they considered less information overall, customs officers 
were able to make more accurate screening decisions than the less experienced group of novices. 
This is similar to the finding in Reyna & Lloyd regarding medical decision making – experts are 
making better decisions based on fewer dimensions of information, suggesting reliance on 
bottom line meaning rather than complex weighing of a number of different factors. This result 
has also been found when investigating decision making of experienced burglars, police officers, 
and a novice group of graduate students (experts processed fewer cues) regarding how likely a 
given house is to be burgled (Garcia-Retamero & Dhani, 2009).  
Research into expert decision making in the intelligence and security domain has also 
provided support for FTTs second prediction, that experts will show more bias that novices in 
their area of expertise in tasks in which bias is caused by reliance on gist. Intelligence agents are 
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experts in making risky decisions (for example decisions concerning national security). One bias 
in risky decision making that FTT associates with gist-based processing is risky choice framing.  
 Before we discuss expertise, we should explain framing effects:  Changes in the positive 
(gains) or negative (losses) wording of the same objective information, known as framing, can 
have a large impact on judgments and risk preferences (Reyna et al., 2014; see Levin, Schneider, 
& Gaeth, 1998, and Kühberger & Tanner, 2010 for reviews).  For example, in the so-called 
Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), in the gain frame, the options are “200 
lives saved for sure” and “1/3 chance of 600 saved or 2/3 chance of 0 saved”; most people 
choose the risk-free option in the gains frame (to save 200 lives for sure). In the corresponding 
loss frame, the choice is between “400 lives lost for sure” and “2/3 chance of 600 lost or 1/3 of 0 
lost”; most people choose the risk-seeking option in this condition (2/3 chance of 600 lost or 1/3 
of 0 lost). Because 600 are expected to die in all scenarios, 200 save is equivalent to 400 die.  
Therefore, difference in choice selection across frames is viewed as a violation of preference 
consistency (the options are the same), a basic axiom of rational decision making (Machina, 
1982; Savage, 1954; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).   
FTT predicts framing effects by proposing that the typical choice problems differ in the 
gist that each frame generates. Specifically, in the gain frame, the gist of the risk-free option (200 
lives saved for sure) is “saving some lives”, whereas the gist of the risky option (1/3 chance of 
600 saved or 2/3 chance of 0 saved) is “saving some lives or saving none.” Given that most 
people value saving some lives over saving none, they select the sure option in the gain frame. In 
the loss frame, however, the gist of the risk-free option (400 lives lost for sure) is “losing some 
lives” whereas the gist of the risky option (2/3 chance of 600 lost or 1/3 of 0 lost) is “losing some 
lives or losing none.” (The distillation to none vs. some is not arbitrary but is the simplest gist of 
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the numerical information in this problem.)  Here, because most people prefer to lose no lives 
rather than some lives, the risk-seeking option is typically chosen in the loss frame. Thus, 
increasing gist-based processing is predicted to increase framing effects. 
Several critical tests have consistently supported this interpretation (Kühberger & Tanner, 
2010; Mandel, 2001; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991; Reyna, et al., 2014; Stocke, 1998). In one, Reyna 
et al. (2014) presented the same preamble to subjects but modified the format of the risky-choice 
decision option to either emphasize categorical some / none distinctions between the options  (to 
encourage reliance on gist) or to emphasize the equal expected value of the options (to encourage 
reliance on verbatim) (Reyna et al. 2014). Take the example of an original framing problem that 
had 600 lives at stake and the original gain frame choice was between (a) definitely saving 200 
and (b) a 1/3 chance of saving 200 and a 2/3 chance of saving 0. In the gist condition, the 
preamble would be identical, but the options would be presented as (a) definitely saving 200 and 
(b) a 2/3 chance of saving 0 (i.e. (a) some v (b) none). In the verbatim condition, again the 
preamble would be identical, but the options would be presented as (a) definitely saving 200 and 
(b) a 1/3 chance of saving 600 (i.e. (a) some v (b) some). Although the missing information was 
available in the preamble and subjects reported understanding the full range of options, framing 
effects were pronounced when the gist (categorical contrast) was emphasized but eliminated 
when verbatim processing was encouraged. This supports FTT’s prediction (described above) 
that gist-based processing increases framing effects. 
Because FTT views framing as a bias caused by reliance on gist, the theory predicts an 
increase in framing with expertise. Therefore, in the area of risky decision making, FTT predicts 
that intelligence agents should show more framing than controls.  Reyna et al. (2014) 
investigated this by providing intelligence agents, college students and post-college adults with a 
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series of risky-choice framing tasks involving lives and other values outcomes that varied in 
frame (gain or loss) and truncation (the risky option presented was either the standard option, or 
truncated to encourage reliance on categorical differences (gist) or analytic calculation 
(verbatim) (as described above). These problems were intended to be in the intelligence agent’s 
area of expertise due to their focus on risking lives and other valued outcomes.  
As predicted by FTT, because of training and regular experience in making life or death 
decisions, intelligence agents showed overall framing biases that were larger than those of 
college students and marginally larger than those of post-college adults. No group showed 
framing effects in the condition encouraging verbatim processing, the framing effect shown by 
intelligence agents in the standard condition (not truncated to encourage reliance on gist or 
verbatim processing) was similar to the framing effect shown by college students in the condition 
designed to encourage reliance on gist. This suggests that by encouraging college students to rely 
on gist, we can make their decision making more comparable to that of experts. This supports 
FTTs contention that experts are cognitively disposed to reliance on gist-based processing. These 
effects were observed for the dependent variables of subject’s choices and their strength of 
preference. An analysis of confidence ratings also revealed that the intelligence agents were 
more confident in their responses than either of the other two groups. Thus, intelligence agents 
were not only more biased than students (they framed more), they were also more confident in 
their decisions.  
This is not predicted by traditional dual-process theories. Such theories often associate 
framing with Type 1 thinking (Peters et al, 2006), or at least associate more within-subjects 
framing (where each participant receives problems in the gain frame and the loss frame) with 
more Type 1 thinking (see Stanovich & West, 2008). Most decision theories predict that 
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increases in analytical reasoning ability – such as that gained by increases in age and expertise – 
should reduce or eliminate framing effects by revealing the equivalency of the options and 
increasing the consistency of preferences. As illustrated above, empirical research supports FTT 
predictions that framing effects increase with expertise.  
Explanations of developmental reversals (specifically reversals from children to adults) 
that are consistent with traditional dual process theory have been provided based on the fact 
children (or those with less expertise) may be responding randomly or may not have developed 
certain knowledge (such as stereotypes) that may interfere with rational responding (see Toplak, 
in press). However, these explanations do not fit the data showing developmental reversals from 
children to adults, which show that children do have knowledge and competence in probability 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1994), that children’s responses vary systematically with risk and outcome – 
as the probability of getting nothing goes up in the gamble, they choose this less (Reyna & Ellis, 
1994), and are not always based on knowledge such as stereotypes (for example in the case of 
risky choice framing) (see Reyna & Ellis, 1994).  
 
Legal Experts 
Legal experts, most notably judges, make important decisions routinely. Judges decide 
approximately as many cases at trial as juries (Clermont & Eisenberg, 1992) and the judicial role 
also includes ruling on dispositive motions and ruling on matters of law (for example whether 
evidence is admissible or whether a witness is competent to testify). This means that the quality 
of decisions that judges make is important for the legal system and individuals more generally. 
Because of this, it is important to understand how judges make decisions, and any biases they are 
subject to that could lead to harmful consequences in the real world.  
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In the legal literature, research into judicial decision making has focused on the debate 
between formalism (when judges apply the law in a clear, uniform, and consistent way and 
realism (when judges use their interpretation of facts and the law to decide cases and then use 
law to provide a post hoc rationale) (Neuborne, 1992; Posner, 1986; Leiter, 1999). Legal 
formalism states that judges apply the law to the facts of a case in a clear, uniform, and 
consistent way, without regard for social interests and public policy (Leiter, 1999). In contrast, 
legal realism suggests that judges’ decisions are highly influenced by their own interpretations of 
facts and the law, reacting primarily to the facts of the case involved, and then using the law to 
provide a post-hoc rationale for a decision (Leiter, 1999). This debate has several parallels to 
traditional dual-process accounts that have recently been applied to judicial decision making 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007). According to traditional 
theories, judges make initial intuitive judgments (using Type 1 processing), much like legal 
realism, but they can override their initial judgments with deliberation (using Type 2 processing), 
and make decisions more in line with legal formalism. So, according to these models intuitive 
decision making is responsible for inaccurate and inconsistent judicial decisions (Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007).  
FTT provides an alternative explanation of judicial decision making, consistent with the 
empirical research that has been conducted on judicial decision making and the broader research 
on decision making in experts (for example the research on medical experts discussed above). 
This is a new kind of intuitionism, recognizing that experts are cognitively disposed to rely on 
intuition to a greater extent than novices, but that this facilitates advanced decision making, 
which can result in superior decision making through understanding of meaning and the “nub” of 
a decision, but can also result in bias where context foments a semantic bias (see Weldon, 
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Corbin, & Reyna, 2013). Specifically, and as noted above, reliance on gist results in bias where 
context foments a semantic bias.  
Research in to the decision making of legal experts has supported FTT’s prediction that 
experts rely on simpler gist-based distinctions (rather than surface level similarities) when 
making decisions. One study examining real legal cases regarding punitive damage awards 
(monetary awards intended to punish a defendant and deter them from engaging in the same 
conduct again, rather than just to compensate a claimant) showed that non-expert legal decision 
makers (but not judges) award the same ratio of punitive to compensatory damages regardless of 
the nature and extent of the injuries involved in the case (bodily injury or non-bodily injury; 
Eisenberg, Rachlinski, & Wells, 2002). This was true despite the fact that inflicting bodily injury 
on someone is generally considered more heinous and deserving of punishment than inflicting 
non-bodily injury. Thus, non-expert decision-makers were less able than judges at assigning 
damages that were consistent with the nature of harm in the case, suggesting that they rely less 
on gist processing because they have a lower level of understanding of the facts and relative 
magnitudes in the case. This is consistent with FTT as jurors (novices) are predicted to rely more 
on verbatim processing which would not distinguish between qualitatively different types of 
harm (as it is based on surface level detail, such as numbers). Judges, who rely more on gist 
processing would be predicted to take account of more qualitative factors due to reliance of 
bottom line meaning in a decision.   
In addition, research has shown that judges are susceptible to biases associated with 
reliance on gist-based processing. One bias relevant to judicial decision making that has been 
associated with gist-based processing is hindsight bias (the inclination to see an event as having 
been predictable after it has occurred; Reyna, 2005). Hindsight bias is an example of a verbatim-
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gist dissociation effect (see Reyna, 2005). An individual relying on verbatim would make the 
same decision in foresight or in hindsight (as the facts are the same) but an individual relying on 
gist would be influenced by inferences based on meaning or context which may lead them to 
judge a situation differently in hindsight (similar to constructive memory). 
Research has shown that judges are susceptible to hindsight bias in their area of expertise 
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001). Guthrie et al. asked judges to predict the Court of 
Appeals’ response to an appeal from the District Court. They were given specific facts regarding 
a case decided by the district court and were told that the decision of the district court in this case 
had been appealed to the court of appeals. They were then split into three conditions. A third of 
participants were told that the court of appeals had sent the case back to the district court for 
imposition of a lesser sanction, a third of participants were told the court of appeals had affirmed 
the district court’s decision and the final third of participants were told that the court of appeals 
had overturned the decision of the district court. Judges from all three conditions were then asked 
to judge retrospectively which of the three actions the court of appeals was most likely to have 
taken, considering the case facts. In this case, the judges displayed hindsight bias because 
knowing the outcome in the court of appeals significantly affected their assessments. 
Judges have also been shown to be susceptible to hindsight bias in considering the types 
of evidence that they frequently consider, for example evidence regarding “probable cause” 
(Rachlinski, Guthrie, & Wistrich, 2011). Probable cause is the standard used to determine the 
legality of police searches (in hindsight or in foresight), and requires that there be a reasonable 
chance the search will turn up evidence of a crime. Usually a judge will assess this before the 
search has been conducted, but in some cases the police can conduct a search without a warrant. 
In these cases, the police still need probable cause but whether this was present is judged 
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retrospectively. Over three experiments, Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich (2011) presented 
hypothetical cases to 900 state and federal judges and asked them to make a determination of 
probable cause either in foresight (asking for a warrant) or in hindsight (where a police search 
had been conducted and incriminating evidence had been found).  They found that hindsight 
affected judge’s ability to assess the likely outcomes of the search (although it should be noted 
that this did not ultimately affect their rulings, perhaps because the change in probability 
estimates was not large enough to push the case from one judgment to the other).  
In these experiments judges were not compared directly with non-expert controls. It is 
likely that hindsight bias would also have influenced non-experts in these situations where there 
is no special knowledge involved (most adults would make inferences that once evidence has 
been found it was more likely to be found, or once a decision has been made it was more likely 
to be made that way). Future research should test this prediction and also consider situations in 
which expertise would lead to specific inferences that would promote greater susceptibility to 
hindsight bias.   
Ultimately, FTT provides an alternate explanation to formalism, realism or traditional 
dual-process theory when considering judicial decision making. Future experiments could test 
this theory by providing judges and non-experts with identical materials and investigating how 
decisions are being made.  
 
Educational Experts 
FTT can also lend valuable insight into decisions made by other experts in their areas of 
expertise, such as the educational decisions made by superintendents and principals. Such 
decisions can affect large numbers of students for extended periods of time when those decisions 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 23	
implement policies that might be resistant to change. In a study of middle and junior high school 
principals, Miller, Fagley and Casella (2009) found that the framing of information did have a 
significant impact on policy decisions in an educational setting. Variants of the classic risky-
choice framing vignette appropriate for a school setting were constructed that included a choice 
between a certain (risk-free) option and a riskier but possibly more successful option. In one 
scenario, the success rate of a remedial reading program was varied – the risk-free program 
offered a certain success rate of 40% (failure rate of 60%), whereas the riskier program was 
described as having a 40% chance of being successful for all students and a 60% chance of being 
successful for no students (or a 40% chance of failing for no students and a 60% chance of 
failing for all students). As with professionals in the previously reviewed domains, principals 
were more likely to select risky options when the information was framed in a negative way than 
when information was framed in a positive way.  
FTT’s account of this violation of preference consistency is similar to previous domains. 
That is, according to FTT, principals (like other experts) have developed a strong reliance on gist 
processing that typically aids decision making by capitalizing on knowledge, experience and 
intuition, but also increases the susceptibility to specific biases. In the gain frame, because some 
students succeeding is better than no students succeeding, the certain outcome of a 40% success 
rate was chosen most often. In the loss frame, however, because some students failing is worse 
than no students failing, the risky option was chosen most often in which potentially no students 
would fail. Such phrasing of decisions elicits a gist that violates a basic axiom of rational 
decision making i.e. preference consistency) when gains (successes) and losses (failures) do not 
differ, however sensitivity to context is generally an adaptive approach to decision making.  
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Conclusions and Differences with Other Theories. 
In this chapter we have discussed a theoretical perspective – fuzzy trace theory – that 
explains and predicts counter-intuitive empirical results in the expert decision making literature. 
We then applied the theory to specific areas of expert decision making to highlight the various 
insights FTT provides.  The theoretical predictions and empirical evidence examined in this 
chapter support the hypothesis that, as individuals gain greater experience and expertise, their 
decision making becomes increasingly gist-based. This advanced intuition leads experts to make 
decisions based on simpler distinctions and fewer dimensions of information, compared to those 
used by novices, that are also often more accurate. For example, research showed that doctors 
and customs officials with relatively greater experience and expertise in their area made more 
accurate decisions based on fewer dimensions of information and judges (but not jurors) were 
able to distinguish meaningfully different cases from one another, recognizing what was truly 
important in cases that were quantitatively comparable. However, this can also lead to increased 
biases in experts (in their domain of expertise) where context foments a semantic bias (e.g. in the 
framing task) – research showed intelligence officers to be more susceptible to framing bias than 
college students in risky choice framing tasks, and medical experts to be more susceptible to 
framing bias than medical students when making medical decisions.  
FTT’s account differs from traditional dual-process theory by recognizing a 
developmental shift from surface level verbatim processing to meaning based gist processing. 
This shift explains not only the superior decision making of experts where an understanding of 
meaning is required, but also developmental reversals where reliance on meaning can result in 
predictable bias. Although traditional dual-process theory expects that experts can make superior 
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decisions but also be subject to heuristics and biases, it does not provide an explanation for why 
we see developmental reversals in specific types of bias from novice to expert.  
Understanding where we are likely to see superior reasoning in experts and where we 
might see similar reasoning or even inferior reasoning to novices can not only provide insight 
into the decision making of experts, but can also inform policy. Knowing when a gist-based 
approach might cause bias in experts and when it is essential for good decision making can 
provide insight into which decisions should be made by experts, and which could be delegated to 
less experienced colleagues, or even advanced machines.   
 
 
  
  
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 26	
 
References 
Adam, M. B., & Reyna, V. F. (2005). Coherence and correspondence criteria for rationality: 
Experts’ estimation of risks of sexually transmitted infections. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 18(3), 169-186. doi: 10.1002/bdm.493. 
Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin, 93(2), 203-231. 
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.93.2.203. 
Barbey, A. K., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual 
process. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(3), 241-254. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07001653 
Braunwald, E., Antman, E. M., Beasley, J. W., Califf, R. M., Cheitlin, M. D., Hochman, J. S., et 
al. (2002). ACC/AHA 2002 guideline update for the management of patients with unstable 
angina and non-ST- segment elevation myocardial infarction—Summary article: A report of 
the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Practice 
Guidelines. Journal of the American College of Cardiology, 40, 1366–1374. 
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology, 4(1), 55-81. 
doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2.  
Chick, C. F., Reyna, V. F., & Corbin, J. C. (in press).  Framing effects are robust to linguistic 
disambiguation: A critical test of contemporary theories. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 
Chin, M. H., Friedman, P. D., Cassel, C. K., & Lang, R. M. (1997). Differences in generalist and 
specialist physicians’ knowledge and use of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors for 
congestive heart failure. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 12, 523–530. doi: 
10.1046/j.1525-1497.1997.07105.x. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 27	
Christensen, C., Heckerling, P. S., Mackesy, M. E., Bernstein, L. M., & Elstein, A. S. (1991). 
Framing bias among expert and novice physicians. Academic Medicine, 66, S76-S78. 
Clermont, K. M., & Eisenberg, T. (1992). Trial by judge or jury: Transcending empiricism. 
Cornell Law Review, 77, 1124-1177. 
Croskerry, P. (in press). Medical decision making. In Thompson, V. & Ball, L. (Eds.) The 
International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Davidson, D. (1995). The representativeness heuristic and conjunction fallacy effect in children’s 
decision making. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 41, 328–346. 
Dawes, R. M. (1988). Rational choice in an uncertain world. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
De Groot, A. D., & de Groot, A. D. (1978). Thought and Choice in Chess. The Hague 
Netherlands: Mouton.  
Eisenberg, T., Rachlinski, J. J., Wells, M. T. (2002). Reconciling experimental incoherence with 
real-world coherence in punitive damages. Stanford Law Review, 54(6), 1239-1271. 
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with criminal sentences: The 
influence of irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 32(2), 188-200. doi: 10.1177/0146167205282152. 
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. American 
Psychologist, 49(8), 709-724. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.709. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2011). Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and 
developmental applications. Developmental Review, 31, 86-102. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: 
Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223-241.  
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 28	
Garcia-Retamero, R., & Dhami, M. K. (2009). Take-the-best in expert-novice decision 
strategies for residential burglary. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 16, 163–169. doi: 
10.3758/PBR.16.1.163. 
Gigerenzer, G. & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of 
 bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669. doi: 10.1037/0033-
 295X.103.4.650. 
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. W., & Kahneman, D. (2002). The psychology of intuitive judgment: 
Heuristic and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2001). Inside the judicial mind. Cornell Law 
Review, 86, 777-830. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2007). Blinking on the bench: How judges 
decide cases. Cornell Law Review, 93, 1-43. 
Harrold, L. R., Field, T. S., & Gurwitz, J. H. (1999). Knowledge, patterns of care, and outcomes 
of care for generalists and specialists. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 14, 499–511. 
doi: 10.1046/j.1525-1497.1999.08168.x. 
Hux, J. E., Levinton, C. M., & Naylor, C. D. (1994). Prescribing propensity: influence of life-
expectancy gains and drug costs. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 9, 195–201. 
Jacobs, J. E., & Potenza, M. (1991). The use of judgment heuristics to make social and object 
decisions: A developmental perspective. Child Development, 62, 166–178. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY, US: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: 
The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49-81). New York : Cambridge University Press. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 29	
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2005). A model of heuristic judgment. In K. Holyoak & R. G. 
Morrison (Eds.), Thinking and reasoning (pp. 267–293). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G., (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. 
American Psychologist, 64(6), 515-526. doi: 10.1037/a0016755. 
Katz, D., Griffith, J., Beshansky, J., & Selker, H. (1996). The use of empiric clinical data in the 
evaluation of practice guidelines for unstable angina. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 276, 1568–1574. doi: 10.1001/jama.1996.03540190040027. 
Kintsch, W. (1974). The representation of meaning in memory. New York, N.Y: Halstead Press.  
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power: How prople make decisions. Cambrige, MA: MIT Press.  
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. (2010). Rapid decision making on the fire 
ground: The original study plus a postscript. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision 
Making, 4 (Special Issue on 20 years of NDM), 186-209. 
Kühberger, A., & Tanner, C. (2010). Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison 
of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23(3), 
314–329. doi: 10.1002/bdm.656. 
Leiter, B. (1999). Positivism, formalism, realism. Columbia Law Review, 99(4), 1138-1165. 
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A typology 
and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 76, 149-188. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1998.2804. 
Lloyd, F. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2009). Clinical gist and medical education: Connecting the dots. 
JAMA, 302(12), 1332-1333. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.1383. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 30	
Machina, M. J. (1982). ‘‘Expected Utility’’ analysis without the independence axiom. 
Econometrica, 50, 277–323. 
Mandel, D. R. (2001). Gain-loss framing and choice: Separating outcome formulations from 
descriptor formulations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85, 56–
76. doi: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2932. 
Marteau, T. M. (1989). Framing of information: Its influence upon decisions of doctors and 
patients. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 89–94. 
McGettigan, P., Sly, K., O’Connell, D., Hill, S., & Henry, D. (1999). The effects of information 
framing on the practices of physicians. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 14, 633-642. 
McNeil, B. J., Pauker, S. G., Sox, H. C., & Tversky, A. (1982). On the elicitation of preferences 
for alternative therapies. The New England Journal of Medicine, 306, 1259–62. doi: 
10.1056/NEJM198205273062103. 
Miller, P. M., Fagley, N. S., & Casella, N. E. (2009). Effects of problem frame and gender on 
principals’ decision making. Social Psychology of Education, 12, 397-413. 
Neuborne, B. (1992). Of sausage factories and syllogism machines: formalism, realism and 
exclusionary selection techniques. New York University Law Review, 67, 419-449. 
Pachur, T., & Marinello, G. (2013). Expert intuitions: How to model the decision strategies of 
airport customs officers? Acta Psychologia, 144, 97-103. 
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy 
and decision making. Psychological Science, 17(5), 408-414. 
Posner, R. A. (1986). Legal formalism, legal realism, and the interpretation of statutes and the 
constitution. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 37, 179-217. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 31	
Rachlinski, J. J., Guthrie, C., & Wistrich, A. J. (2011). Probable cause, probability and hindsight. 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 8(1), 72-98. doi: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2011.01230.x. 
Reyna, V. F. (1991). Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions. 
Developmental Review, 11, 317–336. doi: 10.1016/0273-2297(91)90017-I. 
Reyna, V. F. (1995). Interference effects in memory and reasoning: A fuzzy-trace theory 
analysis. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and inhibition in cognition 
(pp. 29–59). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Reyna, V. F. (2005). Fuzzy-trace theory, judgment, and decision making: A dual-processes 
approach. In C. Izawa & N. Ohta (Eds.), Human Learning and Memory: Advances in theory 
and application: The 4th Tsukuba International Conference on Memory (pp. 239-256). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers 
Reyna, V. F. (2008). A theory of medical decision making and health: Fuzzy trace theory. 
Medical Decision Making, 28(6), 850-865. doi:10.1177/0272989X08327066. 
Reyna, V. F. (2012). A new intuitionism: meaning, memory, and development in fuzzy trace 
theory. Judgment and Decision Making, 7(3), 332-359. 
Reyna, V.F. (2013). Intuition, reasoning and development. A fuzzy trace theory approach. In 
Barrouillet, P. & Gauffroy, C. (Eds.), The Development of Thinking and Reasoning (pp. 193-
220). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1991). Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist 
extraction, truncation, and conversion. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 4, 249–262. 
doi: 10.1002/bdm.3960040403. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 32	
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1994). The origins of probability judgment: A review of data 
and theories. In Wright G. & Ayton, P. (Eds.), Subjective Probability (pp. 239-272). Oxford, 
England: John Wiley & Sons.  
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis. Learning and 
Individual Differences, 7, 1–75. doi: 10.1016/1041-6080(95)90031-4. 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (2008). Numeracy, ratio bias, and denominator neglect in 
judgments of risk and probability. Learning and Individual Differences, 18(1), 89-107. 
Reyna, V. F. & Brainerd, C. J. (2011). Dual-process in decision making and developmental 
neuroscience: A fuzzy-trace model. Developmental Review, 31(2-3), 180-206. doi: 
10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.004. 
Reyna, V. F., Chick, C. F., Corbin, J. C., & Hsia, A. N. (2014). Developmental reversals in risky 
decision making: Intelligence agents show larger decision biases than college students. 
Psychological Science, 25(1), 76–84. doi:10.1177/0956797613497022. 
Reyna, V. F., Corbin, J. C., Weldon, R. B., & Brainerd, C. J. (2016). How fuzzy-trace theory 
predicts true and false memories for words and sentences. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 5(1), 1-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.12.003. 
Reyna, V. F., & Ellis, S. C. (1994). Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in children’s risky 
decision making. Psychological Science, 5, 275–279. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994. 
tb00625.x. 
Reyna, V. F., Estrada, S. M., DeMarinis, J. A., Myers, R. M., Stanisz, J. M., & Mills, B. A. 
(2011). Neurobiological and memory models of risky decision making in adolescents versus 
young adults. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
37(5), 1125–1142. doi: 10.1037/a0023943.  
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 33	
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006).  Risk and rationality in adolescent decision making: 
Implications for theory, practice, and public policy. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 7(1), 1-44. doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x 
Reyna, V. F., & Hamilton, A. J. (2001). The importance of memory in informed consent for 
surgical rusk. Medical Decision Making, 21(2), 152-155. doi: 
10.1177/0272989X0102100209. 
Reyna, V.F., Holliday, R., & Marche, T. (2002). Explaining the development of false memories. 
Developmental Review, 22(3), 436-489. doi: 10.1016/S0273-2297(02)00003-5. 
Reyna, V. F., & Lloyd, F. J. (1997). Theories of false memory in children and adults. Learning 
and Individual Differences, 9(2), 95-123. doi: 10.1016/S1041-6080(97)90002-9. 
Reyna, V. F., & Lloyd, F. J. (2006). Physician decision making and cardiac risk: effects of 
knowledge, risk perception, risk tolerance, and fuzzy processing. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 12(3), 179-195. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.12.3.179. 
Reyna, V. F., Lloyd, F. J., & Brainerd, C. J. (2003). Memory, development, and rationality: An 
integrative theory of judgment and decision making. In Schneider S. & Shanteau, J. (Eds.) 
Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research (pp. 201-245), New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Reyna, V. F., Wilhelms, E. A., McCormick, M. J., Weldon, R. B. (2015). Development of 
decision making and risk-taking: A fuzzy-trace theory neurobiological perspective. Child 
Development Perspectives, 9(2), 122-127. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12117. 
Rivers, S. E., Reyna, V. F., & Mills, B. (2008). Risk Taking Under the Influence: A Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory of Emotion in Adolescence. Developmental Review, 28(1), 107–144. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.11.002. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 34	
Salerno, S. M., Alguire, P. C., & Waxman, H. S. (2003). Competency in interpretation of 12-lead 
electrocardiograms: A summary and appraisal of published evidence. Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 138, 751–760. doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-138-9-200305060-00013. 
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley. 
Schraagen, J. M. (in press). Naturalistic Decision Making. In Thompson, V. & Ball, L. (Eds.) 
The International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Shanteau, J., & Stewart, T. R. (1992). Why study expert decision making? Some historical 
perspectives and comments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
53(2), 95-106. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008). On the relative independence of thinking biases and 
cognitive ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 672–695. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 . 
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011). The complexity of developmental 
predictions from dual-process models. Developmental Review, 31, 103–108.  
Stocke, V. (1998). Framing oder Informationsknappheit? Zur Erkla ̈rung der 
Formulierungseffekte beim Asian-Disease-Problem. In U. Druwe , & V. Kunz (Hrsg.), 
Anomalien in der Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie (pp. 197–218). Opladen: Leske R 
Budrich. 
Thompson, V. A. (2014). What intuitions are... and are not. The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, 60, 35-75. 
Toplak, M. (in press). The development of rational thinking: Insights from the heuristics and 
biases literature and dual-process models. In Thompson, V. & Ball, L. (Eds.) The 
International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 35	
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974).  Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.  
Science, 185 (4157), 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. 
Science, 211, 453-458. doi: 10.1126/science.7455683. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgments of and by representativeness. In D. Kahneman, 
P. Slovic & A. Tversky, (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 84-
98). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 60, 53–85. 
Weldon, R. B., Corbin, J. C., & Reyna, V. F. (2013). Gist processing in judgment and decision 
making: Developmental reversals predicted by fuzzy-trace theory. In H. Markovits (Ed.), 
Understanding the development of reasoning and decision making. Psychology Press.  
Wilhelms, E. A., Corbin, J. C., & Reyna, V. F. (2015). Gist memory in reasoning and decision 
making. In. Feeney A. & Thompson, V. (Eds.), Reasoning as Memory. New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
  
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 36	
 
 
Table 1: FTT predictions and support for these predictions in the basic science literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FTT Prediction Critical Test Empirical Support 
Information is encoded in 
multiple representations 
with varying levels of 
precision (from gist to 
verbatim) 
Can cue retrieval of gist or verbatim trace 
by manipulating cue given to participants. 
Reyna & Kiernan, 
1994; Reyna & 
Kiernan, 1995.   
Verbatim and gist 
representations are 
independent 
Manipulations that improve verbatim 
memory for numbers or sentences should 
not improve gist memory.  
Brainerd & Gordon, 
1994; 
Reyna, 1992; Reyna, 
1995; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995.  
Verbatim and gist 
representations are 
retrieved independently 
Misrecognizing gist should be independent 
of memory for verbatim information. 
Reyna & Kiernan, 
1994; Reyna & 
Kiernan, 1995. 
